Creation of GKO. State Defense Committee (USSR) Creation of the State Defense Committee of the USSR

State Defense Committee - created during the Great Patriotic War an emergency governing body that had full power in the USSR. The need for creation was obvious, since in wartime it was necessary to concentrate all the executive and legislative powers in the country in one governing body. Stalin and the Politburo actually headed the state and made all decisions. However, the decisions made formally came from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, etc. In order to eliminate such a method of leadership, which was acceptable in peacetime, but did not meet the requirements of the military situation of the country, it was decided to create the State Defense Committee , which included some members of the Politburo, secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Stalin himself, as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

The State Defense Committee was formed on June 30, 1941 by a joint resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The need to create the State Defense Committee as the highest governing body was motivated by the difficult situation at the front, which required that the leadership of the country be centralized to the maximum extent possible. The said resolution states that all orders of the State Defense Committee must be unquestioningly carried out by citizens and any authorities.

The idea of ​​​​creating the State Defense Committee was put forward at a meeting in Molotov’s office in the Kremlin, which was also attended by Beria, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Voznesensky. In the afternoon (after 4 o’clock) they all went to the Near Dacha, where powers were distributed among the members of the State Defense Committee.

By a joint resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 30, 1941, it was formed State Committee defense consisting of:

Chairman of the State Defense Committee - J.V. Stalin

Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee - V. M. Molotov.

Members of the State Defense Committee - K. E. Voroshilov, G. M. Malenkov, L. P. Beria.

Subsequently, the composition of the State Defense Committee changed several times.

• On February 3, 1942, N. A. Voznesensky (at that time Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR) and A. I. Mikoyan were appointed members of the State Defense Committee;
• On February 20, 1942, L. M. Kaganovich was introduced into the State Defense Committee;
• On May 16, 1944, L.P. Beria was appointed deputy chairman of the State Defense Committee.
• On November 22, 1944, N.A. Bulganin was appointed a member of the State Defense Committee instead of K.E. Voroshilov.

The first decree of the State Defense Committee (“On organizing the production of medium tanks T-34 at the Krasnoye Sormovo plant”) was issued on July 1, 1941, the last (No. 9971 “On payment for the remainder of incomplete ammunition elements accepted from industry and located at the bases of the NKO USSR and NKVMF ") - September 4, 1945. The numbering of resolutions remained continuous.

Of the 9,971 resolutions and orders adopted by the State Defense Committee during its work, 98 documents remain classified in full and three more partially (they relate mainly to the production of chemical weapons and the atomic problem).

Most of the GKO resolutions were signed by its chairman, Stalin, some also by his deputy Molotov and GKO members Mikoyan and Beria.

The State Defense Committee did not have its own apparatus; its decisions were prepared in the relevant people's commissariats and departments, and paperwork was carried out by the Special Sector of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

The overwhelming majority of GKO resolutions were classified as “Secret”, “Top Secret” or “Top Secret/Especially Important” (designation “s”, “ss” and “ss/s” after the number), but some resolutions were open and published in the press (an example of such a resolution is GKO Resolution No. 813 of October 19, 1941 on the introduction of a state of siege in Moscow).

The vast majority of GKO resolutions concerned topics related to the war:

evacuation of population and industry (during the first period of the Great Patriotic War);

mobilization of industry, production of weapons and ammunition;

handling captured weapons and ammunition;

studying and exporting to the USSR captured samples of technology, industrial equipment, reparations (at the final stage of the war);

organization of combat operations, distribution of weapons, etc.;

appointment of authorized representatives of State Defense Committees;

about the beginning of “work on uranium” (the creation of nuclear weapons);

structural changes in the GKO itself.

The State Defense Committee included several structural divisions. During its existence, the structure of the Committee has changed several times in order to maximize management efficiency and adapt to current conditions.

The most important unit was the Operations Bureau, created on December 8, 1942 by GKO Resolution No. 2615c. The bureau included V. M. Molotov, L. P. Beria, G. M. Malenkov and A. I. Mikoyan. The tasks of this unit initially included control and monitoring of the current work of all People's Commissariats of the defense industry, People's Commissariats of Railways, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, power plants, oil, coal and chemical industries, as well as the matter of drawing up and executing plans for production and supply of these industries and transport with everything you need. On May 19, 1944, Resolution No. 5931 was adopted, by which the functions of the bureau were significantly expanded - now its tasks included monitoring and control over the work of the people's commissariats of the defense industry, transport, metallurgy, people's commissariats of the most important areas of industry and power plants; Also, from that moment on, the Operations Bureau was responsible for supplying the army; finally, it was entrusted with the responsibilities of the Transport Committee, which was abolished by decision.

On August 20, 1945, a Special Committee was created to deal with the development of nuclear weapons. Within the framework of the Special Committee, on the same day, August 20, 1945, the first department was created under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, which was engaged in the creation of a new industry in a short time.

The system of three main departments under the State Defense Committee was created with the expectation of the post-war development of fundamentally new industries and lasted much longer than the committee itself. This system directed a significant part of the resources of the Soviet economy to the development of the nuclear sector, the radar industry and the space sector. At the same time, the main departments decided not only the goals of improving the country’s defense capability, but were also a sign of the importance of their leaders. Thus, for reasons of secrecy, for several years after its creation, the PSU did not provide any information about the composition and results of its work to any bodies other than the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.

The main function of the State Defense Committee was to manage all military and economic issues during the war. The leadership of the military operations was carried out through Headquarters.

The State Defense Committee, created during the Great Patriotic War, was an emergency governing body that had full power in the USSR. The Chairman of the State Defense Committee was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I.V. Stalin, his deputy was the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov. The State Defense Committee included L.P. Beria. (People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR), Voroshilov K.E. (Chairman of the KO under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR), Malenkov G.M. (Secretary, Head of the Personnel Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)). In February 1942, the following were introduced into the State Defense Committee: Voznesensky N.A. (1st Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars) and Mikoyan A.I. (Chairman of the Committee for Food and Clothing Supply of the Red Army), Kaganovich L.M. (Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars). In November 1944, N.A. Bulganin became a new member of the GKO. (Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR), and Voroshilov K.E. was removed from the State Defense Committee.

The State Defense Committee was endowed with broad legislative, executive and administrative functions; it united the military, political and economic leadership of the country. The resolutions and orders of the State Defense Committee had the force of wartime laws and were subject to unquestioning execution by all party, state, military, economic and trade union bodies. However, the USSR Armed Forces, the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and the People's Commissariats also continued to act, implementing the resolutions and decisions of the State Defense Committee. During the Great Patriotic War, the State Defense Committee adopted 9,971 resolutions, of which approximately two-thirds concerned the problems of the war economy and the organization of military production: the evacuation of the population and industry; mobilization of industry, production of weapons and ammunition; handling captured weapons and ammunition; organization of combat operations, distribution of weapons; appointment of authorized representatives of State Defense Committees; structural changes in the State Defense Committee itself, etc. The remaining resolutions of the State Defense Committee concerned political, personnel, and other issues.

Functions of the State Defense Committee: 1) management of the activities of government departments and institutions, directing their efforts towards the full use of the material, spiritual and military capabilities of the country to achieve victory over the enemy; 2) mobilization of the country’s human resources for the needs of the front and the national economy; 3) organization of uninterrupted operation of the defense industry of the USSR; 4) resolving issues of restructuring the economy on a war footing; 5) evacuation of industrial facilities from threatened areas and transfer of enterprises to liberated areas; 6) training reserves and personnel for the Armed Forces and industry; 7) restoration of the economy destroyed by the war; 8) determining the volume and timing of industrial supplies of military products.

The State Defense Committee set military-political tasks for the military leadership, improved the structure of the Armed Forces, determined the general nature of their use in war, and appointed leading personnel. The working bodies of the State Defense Committee on military issues, as well as the direct organizers and executors of its decisions in this area were the People's Commissariats of Defense (NCOs of the USSR) and Navy(NK USSR Navy).

From the jurisdiction of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the People's Commissariats of the defense industry were transferred to the jurisdiction of the State Defense Committee: People's Commissariats of the Defense Industry: People's Commissariats of Aviation Industry, People's Commissariat of Tankoprom, People's Commissariat of Ammunition, People's Commissariat of Armaments, People's Commissariat of Mining Armaments, People's Commissariat of Armaments, People's Commissariat of Sustainable Industry, People's Commissariat of Sustainable Industry, People's Commissariat of Armaments, People's Commissariat of Armaments, People's Commissariat of Industry, People's Commissars of the State Defense Industry, etc. An important role in the implementation of a number of functions of the State Defense Committee was assigned to the corps of its authorized representatives, whose main task was local control over the implementation of GKO decrees on the production of military products. The commissioners had mandates signed by the chairman of the State Defense Committee, Stalin, which clearly defined the practical tasks that the State Defense Committee set for its commissioners. As a result of the efforts made, the output of military products in March 1942 only in the eastern regions of the country reached the pre-war level of its output throughout the entire territory of the Soviet Union.

During the war, in order to achieve maximum management efficiency and adapt to current conditions, the structure of the State Defense Committee was changed several times. One of the important divisions of the State Defense Committee was the Operations Bureau, created on December 8, 1942. The Operations Bureau included L.P. Beria, G.M. Malenkov, A.I. Mikoyan. and Molotov V.M. The tasks of this unit initially included coordinating and unifying the actions of all other GKO units. But in 1944, the functions of the bureau were significantly expanded.

It began to control the current work of all people's commissariats of the defense industry, as well as the preparation and execution of production and supply plans for industrial and transport sectors. The Operations Bureau became responsible for supplying the army; in addition, it was assigned the responsibilities of the previously abolished Transport Committee. “All members of the State Defense Committee were in charge of certain areas of work. Thus, Molotov was in charge of tanks, Mikoyan - matters of quartermaster supply, fuel supply, Lend-Lease issues, and sometimes carried out individual orders from Stalin for the delivery of shells to the front. Malenkov was in charge of aviation, Beria - ammunition and weapons. Everyone came to Stalin with their questions and said: I ask you to make such and such a decision on such and such an issue...”, recalled the head of the Logistics, Army General A.V. Khrulev.

To carry out the evacuation of industrial enterprises and the population from the front-line areas to the east, a Council for Evacuation Affairs was created under the State Defense Committee. In addition, in October 1941, the Committee for the Evacuation of Food Supplies, Industrial Goods and Industrial Enterprises was formed. However, in October 1941, these bodies were reorganized into the Directorate for Evacuation Affairs under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Other important divisions of the State Defense Committee were: the Trophy Commission, created in December 1941, and in April 1943 transformed into the Trophy Committee; A special committee that dealt with the development of nuclear weapons; A special committee dealt with issues of reparations, etc.

The State Defense Committee became the main link in the mechanism of centralized management of the mobilization of the country's human and material resources for defense and armed struggle against the enemy. Having fulfilled its functions, the State Defense Committee was disbanded by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on September 4, 1945.

State Defense Committee

The State Defense Committee is an emergency governing body of the country created during the Great Patriotic War. The need for creation was obvious, since in wartime it was necessary to concentrate all power in the country, both executive and legislative, in one governing body. Stalin and the Politburo actually headed the state and made all decisions. However, the decisions taken formally came from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In order to eliminate such a method of leadership, acceptable in peacetime, but not meeting the requirements of the country's military situation, a decision was made to create the State Defense Committee, which included some members of the Politburo, secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and Stalin himself, as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

The idea of ​​​​creating the State Defense Committee was put forward by L.P. Beria at a meeting in the office of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Molotov in the Kremlin, which was also attended by Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Voznesensky. Thus, the State Defense Committee was formed on June 30, 1941 by a joint resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The need to create the State Defense Committee as the highest governing body was motivated by the difficult situation at the front, which required that the leadership of the country be centralized to the maximum extent possible. The said resolution states that all orders of the State Defense Committee must be unquestioningly carried out by citizens and any authorities.

It was decided to put Stalin at the head of the State Defense Committee, in view of his undeniable authority in the country. Having made this decision, Beria, Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Voznesensky went to the “Near Dacha” in the afternoon of June 30.

Stalin did not give a speech on the radio in the first days of the war, as he understood that his speech could create even more anxiety and panic among people. The fact is that he very rarely spoke publicly, on the radio. In the pre-war years this happened only a few times: in 1936 - 1 time, in 1937 - 2 times, in 1938 - 1, in 1939 - 1, in 1940 - none, until July 3, 1941 - none .

Until June 28 inclusive, Stalin worked intensively in his Kremlin office and received a large number of visitors every day; on the night of June 28-29, he had Beria and Mikoyan, who left the office at about 1 am. After this, the entries in the visitor log ceased and were completely absent for June 29–30, which shows that Stalin did not receive anyone in his office in the Kremlin these days.

Having received on June 29 the first and still vague information about the fall of Minsk that had occurred the day before, he visited the People's Commissariat of Defense, where he had a difficult scene with G.K. Zhukov. After that, Stalin went to the “Near Dacha” and locked himself there, not receiving anyone and not answering phone calls. He remained in this state until the evening of June 30, when (at about 5 p.m.) a delegation (Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Voznesensky) came to see him.

These leaders informed Stalin about the created state governing body and invited him to become chairman of the State Defense Committee, to which Stalin gave his consent. There, on the spot, powers were distributed among the members of the State Defense Committee.

The composition of the State Defense Committee was as follows: Chairman of the State Defense Committee - I.V. Stalin; Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee - V. M. Molotov. Members of the State Defense Committee: L.P. Beria (since May 16, 1944 - deputy chairman of the State Defense Committee); K. E. Voroshilov; G. M. Malenkov.

The composition of the State Defense Committee was subject to changes three times (the changes were legislatively formalized by resolutions of the Presidium of the Supreme Council):

– On February 3, 1942, N. A. Voznesensky (at that time Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR) and A. I. Mikoyan became members of the State Defense Committee;

– On November 22, 1944, N. A. Bulganin became a new member of the GKO, and K. E. Voroshilov was removed from the GKO.

The vast majority of GKO resolutions concerned topics related to the war:

– evacuation of the population and industry (during the first period of the Great Patriotic War);

– mobilization of industry, production of weapons and ammunition;

– handling captured weapons and ammunition;

– study and export to the USSR of captured samples of technology, industrial equipment, reparations (at the final stage of the war);

– organization of combat operations, distribution of weapons, etc.;

– appointment of authorized state bonds;

– the beginning of “work on uranium” (creation of nuclear weapons);

– structural changes in the GKO itself.

The overwhelming majority of GKO resolutions were classified as “Secret”, “Top Secret” or “Top Secret / Of Special Importance”.

Some decisions were open and published in the press - GKO Resolution No. 813 of October 19, 1941 on the introduction of a state of siege in Moscow.

The State Defense Committee managed all military and economic issues during the war. The leadership of the military operations was carried out through Headquarters.

On September 4, 1945, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the State Defense Committee was abolished.

Creation of State Bonds

Stalin's actions in the first days of the war can be called feverish, chaotic and reactive. Not mastering the situation, not knowing how to lead troops, Stalin simply tried to do something, because doing nothing was impossible. Basically these were desperate and inadequate attempts to launch a counterattack, which often, if not in most cases, worsened the situation and caused new casualties.

Stalin, apparently, was fully aware of how great the threat looming over the country was. There is convincing evidence that already in the first days of the war, Stalin tried to come to an agreement with Hitler, ceding to him a number of Soviet territories in the western USSR in exchange for a cessation of hostilities. On Stalin's instructions, Beria organized a meeting between his representative and the envoy of Germany's ally Bulgaria. The diplomat, with the hope of transferring it to Hitler, was asked the question of peace conditions: what territories does Germany claim? The fate of this initiative is unknown. Most likely, the Bulgarian envoy simply did not get involved in mediation. However, such probing of the soil speaks volumes. Even if this was a maneuver aimed at weakening the German offensive impulse, it is obvious that Stalin was aware of the threat of defeat.

Other facts also testified to this. Along with widespread mobilization into the Red Army and the preparation of new lines of defense, mass evacuation began already in the first days of the war. Moreover, it was not only the population and material resources from front-line areas that were subject to removal. A secret but very demonstrative evacuation of the capital, which was still located at a considerable distance from the fighting, was carried out. On June 27, 1941, the Politburo approved a resolution on the urgent (within three days) removal from Moscow of state reserves of precious metals, precious stones, the Diamond Fund of the USSR and the valuables of the Kremlin Armory. On June 28, it was just as urgently decided to evacuate banknotes from the Moscow vaults of the State Bank and Gosznak. On June 29, a decision was made to transfer the apparatus of the people's commissariats and other governing institutions to the rear. On July 2, the Politburo decided to transport the sarcophagus with Lenin’s body to Siberia, and on July 5, the archives, primarily the archives of the government and the Central Committee of the Party.

One of the functionaries, summoned to Stalin on the afternoon of June 26, recalled: “Stalin looked unusual. He doesn't just look tired. The appearance of a man who has suffered a strong internal shock. Before meeting him, based on all sorts of indirect facts, I felt that it was very difficult for us there, in the border battles. Perhaps a rout is brewing. When I saw Stalin, I realized that the worst had already happened.” The next few days did not bring relief. Stalin became increasingly aware of the futility of his orders and the degree of uncontrollability of the army.

Just a week after the start of the war, alarming news began to arrive in Moscow about the dire situation of the Western Front and the surrender of the capital of Belarus, Minsk. Contact with the troops was largely lost. There was a heavy pause in the Kremlin. On June 29, for the first time since the beginning of the war, no meetings were recorded in Stalin’s Kremlin office. According to Mikoyan, in the evening Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan and Beria gathered at Stalin’s. Most likely, the meeting took place either in Stalin’s Kremlin apartment or at his dacha. Stalin called Timoshenko. Again to no avail. The military was not in control of the situation. Alarmed, Stalin broke his usual routine and invited members of the Politburo to go to the People's Commissariat of Defense. Here he was once again convinced that the disaster had acquired enormous proportions. Stalin attacked the generals with reproaches and accusations. Unable to withstand the tension, the Chief of the General Staff Zhukov burst into tears and ran into the next room. Molotov went to calm him down. This scene apparently sobered Stalin. He realized that putting pressure on the military was useless. Coming out of the building of the People's Commissariat of Defense, Stalin, according to Mikoyan and Molotov, said: “Lenin left us a great legacy, we - his heirs - screwed it all up.”

Strong language and rudeness were not uncommon for Stalin. However, in this case they reflected a truly high degree of confusion. Stalin, apparently, left the People's Commissariat of Defense for his dacha.

The next day, June 30, Stalin did not appear not only in his Kremlin office, but in Moscow in general. In a situation of growing catastrophe, such self-isolation could have critical consequences. The huge administrative machine, built for Stalin, inevitably failed in his absence. Something had to be done. Molotov, senior in the informal hierarchy of Politburo members, took the initiative. According to Mikoyan, Molotov said: “Stalin has such prostration that he is not interested in anything, has lost the initiative, and is in poor condition.” This was indirectly confirmed many years later by Molotov himself in conversations with Chuev: “He didn’t show up for two or three days, he was at the dacha. He was worried, of course, he was a little depressed.” It is obvious that Molotov’s memory failed him in detail: Stalin remained at the dacha for a shorter period than two or three days. However, given the catastrophic start of the war, even a short absence of the leader was naturally perceived as critical.

Alarmed, Molotov decided to act. He summoned Beria, Malenkov and Voroshilov to a meeting. This, of course, was not about the formal or actual ousting of Stalin from power. His comrades were racking their brains over how to “lure” Stalin out of his dacha and force him to return to business. The task was not easy. The routine did not include visits to Stalin's dacha without an invitation. In an emergency situation, such an unauthorized visit could be perceived especially painfully by Stalin. It was no less difficult to formulate the reason for such a trip. No one would have dared to openly tell Stalin that his depression threatened the security of the state. However, members of the Politburo, skilled in political intrigue, came up with a brilliant move. They decided all together (definitely together!) to go to Stalin and offer him a project for creating the highest authority for the war period - the State Defense Committee, headed by Stalin himself. In addition to Stalin, it was proposed to include four project developers in the State Defense Committee. Molotov was appointed first deputy chairman of the State Defense Committee.

Now everything worked out smoothly and convincingly. There was a good reason for visiting Stalin, which had nothing to do with the fact that he did not show up at work. The proposal to create a State Defense Committee headed by Stalin demonstrated not only the determination to continue the struggle, but also the devotion of his comrades-in-arms to the leader. The collective trip made it possible to smooth out Stalin's possible indignation.

When the plan was agreed upon by Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov and Beria, Mikoyan and Voznesensky were called into Molotov’s office. They were two members of the steering group whom the Quartet decided not to include in the GKO. However, Mikoyan and Voznesensky were supposed to go to Stalin’s dacha, demonstrating the unity of their ranks.

The story of what happened at Stalin's dacha was left by Mikoyan. According to him, the delegation found Stalin in a small dining room, sitting in a chair. He looked questioningly at his comrades and asked why they had come. “He looked calm, but somehow strange,” Mikoyan recalled. After listening to the proposal to create the State Defense Committee, Stalin agreed. A slight controversy was caused by the Quartet’s draft on the personnel of the State Defense Committee, voiced by Beria. Stalin proposed including Mikoyan and Voznesensky in the GKO. However, Beria, authorized by the Quartet, outlined the arguments against - someone should remain in leadership of the Council of People's Commissars. Stalin did not object.

The publication of Mikoyan’s memoirs in 1999, prepared by his son S. A. Mikoyan, in this fragment contains numerous changes and additions to the original text preserved in the archive. S. A. Mikoyan clearly tried to create the impression of Stalin’s fear. For this purpose, the following phrases were included in the original dictations of A.I. Mikoyan: “When he saw us, he (Stalin. - OH.) seemed to shrink into a chair”; “I have (Mikoyan. – OH.) there was no doubt: he decided that we had come to arrest him.” However, it is important to remember that these accents were added later and do not belong to Mikoyan.

Could Stalin have been scared? How to interpret the meeting at the dacha on June 30? Undoubtedly, this was a crisis moment in the development of Stalin's autocracy. No matter how carefully Stalin's comrades behaved, they violated important rules of the political protocol of the dictatorship. Members of the Politburo came to Stalin, having previously agreed among themselves and on their own initiative. They proposed to make the most important decision and insisted on its adoption in the form in which they agreed among themselves. Of fundamental importance was the formal confirmation of Molotov’s role as the second person in the state and the non-inclusion of Voznesensky, whom Stalin in May 1941 replaced Molotov as his first deputy in the Council of People’s Commissars, into the GKO. In fact, Stalin’s comrades made it clear to him that in the face of a mortal threat, it was necessary to consolidate the leadership that had emerged after the Great Terror, and that the new shake-ups at the top that Stalin started on the eve of the war must stop. This was a unique episode. It marked a temporary change in the character of the dictatorship, the emergence of a wartime political compromise that was somewhere between pre-war tyranny and the Stalinist loyalty of the early 1930s. The principle of compromise relations in the Politburo, forced by Stalin, operated throughout almost the entire war.

The decision to create the State Defense Committee, agreed upon at Stalin’s dacha, was published in the newspapers the next day. The inclusion of only Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov and Malenkov in the GKO did not mean at all that the remaining top leaders of the Politburo had lost their administrative influence. Mikoyan and Voznesensky performed the most important economic functions. Zhdanov concentrated entirely on the defense of Leningrad. Kaganovich, as People's Commissar of Railways, dealt with railways, the importance of which in conditions of war and evacuation was difficult to overestimate. In February 1942, Mikoyan, Voznesensky and Kaganovich were included in the State Defense Committee.

The formation of the State Defense Committee gave impetus to the further concentration of the formal attributes of supreme power in the hands of Stalin. On July 10, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command, headed by People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko, was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command under the leadership of Stalin. On July 19, by decision of the Politburo, Stalin was appointed People's Commissar of Defense, and on August 8 - Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Everything was falling into place. Stalin returned to the people and the army in his usual image of an autocratic leader, decisive and confident of victory. The most important role in this “return of Stalin” was played by his famous speech on the radio on July 3.

Unlike Molotov, who spoke on June 22 in the Central Telegraph building, located next to the Kremlin, Stalin demanded that his speech be broadcast directly from the Kremlin. Overloaded with business, the signalmen were forced to fulfill this senseless whim. Cables were urgently laid into the building of the Council of People's Commissars. Stalin, sitting at a table with microphones and a bottle of Borjomi, read out the speech. This appeal of Stalin to the people was unique in many respects. “Comrades! Citizens! Brothers and sisters! Soldiers of our army and navy! I am addressing you, my friends!” – this very beginning of the speech was unusual and not at all in the Stalinist style. It was specially noted and remembered by many contemporaries of the events. Clinging to the radios or reading the lines of a newspaper report, people looked in Stalin’s words for the answer to the main question: what will happen next, how soon will the war end? However, Stalin did not say anything encouraging. Having significantly exaggerated the losses of the German army (“the best divisions of the enemy and the best parts of his aviation have already been defeated”), Stalin was forced to admit that “it is a matter […] of the life and death of the Soviet state, of the life and death of the peoples of the USSR.” Stalin's calls to the people to realize “the full depth of the danger that threatens our country,” to organize partisan warfare behind German lines, to create militia units, and to remove or destroy all material resources from territories threatened by enemy capture sounded alarming. Stalin declared the outbreak a national and patriotic war. From all this the obvious conclusion followed - the war would be difficult and long.

In the meantime, the people and especially the army needed to at least somehow explain the causes of the disaster and point to the next “scapegoats.” I didn't have to search for long. Soon it was announced that the Western Front had completely collapsed and that its leadership, headed by General D. G. Pavlov, had made mistakes, which clearly indicated the direction of exemplary repression. Pavlov and a number of his subordinates were put on trial and shot. With orders signed by Stalin, the army was widely notified about this.

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Creation of Shekhtel “Let’s go to Gorky’s house,” said F.G. when we came to Herzen, “it’s nearby.” You were there? You can go again, otherwise I’ll never go there alone. They did a good job for the great proletarian writer, they settled him in the mansion of the richest man in Moscow

Creation of TsAKB Memoirs of V.G. Grabina chronologically ends with the beginning of 1942, and we will never learn about subsequent events from the designer himself. But it is possible to reconstruct a picture of Vasily Gavrilovich’s life. At the beginning of 1940, Grabin was awarded the rank of military engineer 1

CREATION OF A LEGEND Volkov: Anna Andreevna didn’t do anything by accident. Brodsky: It’s true.<…>Solomon VOLKOV. Diploma with Brodsky. Page 109The Lord lengthened her days. No matter how you look at it, she was marked by God with at least blessed longevity. That's why it stands on the most

THE CREATION OF SHEKHTEL “Let’s go to Gorky’s house,” said F.G. when we came to Herzen, “it’s nearby.” You were there? You can go again, otherwise I’ll never go there alone. They did a good job for the great proletarian writer, they settled him in the mansion of the richest man in Moscow

Creating an atmosphere The meticulousness of creating an atmosphere is the basis of directing. I speak on my own behalf, but relying on the actor and stage theorist I adore - Mikhail Chekhov, who brilliantly formulated several immutable production laws. Wisdom,

Creation of the SS troops August brought a decision that complicated the position of the Wehrmacht: by Hitler’s order of August 17, 1938, the SS military formations that had already existed for a long time were consolidated into the SS “special purpose” army and thereby the SS troops were created. It's about this

3. Creation of a school My mother went to school when she was six years old, but she studied for only a few months. In the village where she lived, it was very rare for a father to send his daughter to school. Mom turned out to be the only girl in the class. She liked to walk down the street with a bag,

Creation of a machine gun The international situation became more tense every day. The flames of a new world war had already broken out in Europe. Soviet gunsmiths understood that the fire of war, fanned by the Nazis, could be transferred from the West to the East at any time. They

CREATION OF “PPD” The international situation became more tense every day. The flames of a new world war have already flared up in Europe. Soviet gunsmiths, realizing that the fire of war fanned by the Nazis could be transferred from West to East at any time, diligently

CREATION OF SOCIETY In the last days of May 1924, posters were posted on the streets of Moscow, which attracted the attention of almost every passerby. And it’s not surprising: the first thing that caught your eye on this poster were the words: “Interplanetary travel.” It was an announcement about a report

GKO - extraordinary highest government agency, who concentrated all power during the Great Patriotic War. Formed 30.6.1 941, abolished 4.9.1945. Chairman - I.V. Stalin.

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State Defense Committee (GKO)

was created by a joint decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on June 30, 1941 in order to implement measures to quickly mobilize all the forces of the peoples of the USSR to repel the enemy, in view of the state of emergency created as a result of the attack of Nazi Germany on THE USSR. I.V. was appointed Chairman of the State Defense Committee. Stalin. Exercising full power in the state, the State Defense Committee issued decrees binding on all party, Soviet, Komsomol and military bodies and citizens. The State Defense Committee had its own local representatives. As a result of the enormous organizational work of party and Soviet bodies under the leadership of the State Defense Committee, a coherent and rapidly growing military economy was created in the USSR in a short period of time, ensuring the supply of the Red Army with the necessary weapons and the accumulation of reserves for the complete defeat of the enemy. In connection with the end of the war and the end of the state of emergency in the country, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, by decree of September 4, 1945, recognized that the continued existence of the State Defense Committee was not necessary, due to which the State Defense Committee was abolished, and all its affairs were transferred to the Council of People's Commissars THE USSR.